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Abstract

The Great Recession has sparked a debate amongst accounting professionals and
economic analysts. There has been a concerted effort to blame fair value accounting and
FAS 157 as the recession’s root cause and an attempt to challenge FASB to return to the
historic cost principle. This paper examines the guidelines and procedures for mark to
market as established by FASB, observes the events leading up to the recession,
conditions that materialized at the start of the recession, evaluates the role fair value
played in the financial crisis, and considers how fair value should be used in the future.
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Fair Value Accounting
How Bad Decisions Bring Blame to Beneficial Accounting Procedures
The housing bubble, which had been growing in the 1990s and into the new
millennium, began to burst in February 2007. It triggered what is now being considered
the greatest recession in recent memory since the Great Depression. Banks had neither
the necessary reserves to meet their personal obligations and the demands from their
customers nor the liquidity in their investments to quickly convert them into cash to keep
the recession from growing as quickly and as rapidly as it did (Ryan, 2008). Many
different analysts have recently attacked the fair value option, enacted by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) through Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 157
in September, 2006, claiming that the updated accounting rules for the assets and
liabilities of banks was the cause of their illiquidity, and they proposed that continuing
the use of the historic cost method would have prevented the current economic crisis
from transpiring. Additionally, they have written journals and articles claiming that the
FASB must depart from the required use of fair value accounting immediately to prevent
another bubble similar to the housing bubble in late 2007.
The predominant controversy amongst accounting professionals regarding the fair
value option pertains to its apparent departure from the historic principle established
within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). A major objection of detractors
is their belief that the switch to fair value accounting and the addition of the fair value
option helped create the environment responsible for the 2007 recession. More
specifically, the recession was magnified by the inability of banks to continue to loan
capital to businesses, entrepreneurs, and individuals who needed the capital to expand the
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economy. The paramount issues which must be explored include what role fair value
accounting played in the 2007 recession and the ensuing financial crisis. Additionally if
fair value accounting was a major contributor to the recession an investigation must take
place as to how it can be improved or eliminated to prevent a similar financial crisis from
occurring in the future.
The FASB has recently spent much time handling the issue of fair value
accounting and has made changes to fair value guidance both immediately prior to and
since the financial crisis. It is the intention of this paper to prove that although fair value
accounting as established in SFAS 157 enhanced the severity and the swiftness of the
financial crisis, the root cause of the financial crisis was the poor decision making of
bank management by loosely handing out loans to unqualified lenders and their use of
complex financial instruments to support the loans being made. Additionally, while the
FASB recently has more comprehensively defined the rules for fair value accounting in
the marketplace, the fair value accounting procedures for banks must further be made
definitive to prevent false earnings within banks, to decrease volatility in the marketplace
and the potential for market bubbles, and to give a more fair representation of the actual
financial position of banks individually and in their relationship to one another. This will
helps users of these financial statements to more clearly understand the financial position
of banks and more readily alert customers, creditors, investors, and banks themselves of
problematic financing before it is too late.
A Review of Fair Value Accounting
Fair Value Accounting Defined
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Before looking further into this controversy, however, fair value must first be defined and
explored as it is currently used in banks. The FASB defines fair value in ASC 820-10-352 as “the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (FASB 2012).
This does not mean, however, that the fair value of an asset or liability is the current
market value. Although it is possible for these two values to be in correspondence with
one another, a clear and important distinction is that fair value refers to the value as of the
measurement date, which could possibly be open to negotiation between a buyer and
seller, whereas market value is a component of fair value, but not its basis. For example,
the market could show the value of a stock to be at a certain level, but if an orderly
transaction were to occur on that date, negotiations or other factors could cause the fair
value to differ from the apparent market value on the measurement date. FASB
determined that the measurement should be determined by assuming the transaction
occurs in the principal market for the asset or liability, and when no principal market
exists, valuation should be based upon a transaction in the most advantageous market for
the asset or liability. Accordingly, the FASB outlines the proper rules and procedures
determining the market and the actual fair value measurements and disclosures under
section 820 of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification, which will subsequently be
further explained.
Fair value accounting within the Codification is exceptionally far reaching, and is
used for many different business transactions with varying, complex procedures. Because
this paper relates primarily to banks’ use of fair value accounting, prior to, during, and
since the recession, only these fair value procedures will be explored. The most common
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use of fair value measurements are determining fair values for financial instruments, such
as securities, bonds, or loans. Because the fair value option is exceptionally far reaching
and complex, only fair valuation regarding these financial instruments will be explored
and analyzed in depth within the Accounting Standards Codification. This analysis will
then be used to explore fair value’s role in the financial crisis.
Valuation Techniques
The Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) recognizes three different
valuation techniques as acceptable approaches to measuring fair value: the market
approach, income approach, and/or the cost approach. The ASC defines the market
approach as “a valuation technique that uses prices and other relevant information
generated by market transactions involving identical or comparable assets or liabilities”
(FASB 2012). Therefore, the market approach focuses on using comparable assets and
liabilities within the market to determine the value of the asset or liability being
measured. It is necessary to use professional judgment to determine qualitative and
quantitative comparable values under this approach.
FASB defines the income approach as “an approach that uses valuation
techniques to convert future amount to a single present amount” (FASB 2012). Basically,
the income approach uses time value of money techniques to determine present value of
cash flows and earnings based on future expectations. The valuation techniques that the
ASC allows for are present value techniques, option-pricing models, and the multi-period
excess earnings method (used mainly for specific intangible assets).
Thirdly, FASB defines the cost approach “as a valuation technique based on the
amount that currently would be required to replace the service capacity of an asset (often
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referred to as current replacement cost)” (FASB 2012). This definition is the most easily
understood, as it is simply the cost that a market participant would need to pay for an
asset to replace that asset. Along with these three valuation techniques, the FASB created
different inputs to be used based upon the availability of market data which are
subsequently discussed.
Level 1 Through 3 Inputs
When determining fair value, certain measurement techniques will be more
accurate than others depending on how much information is readily available and
determinable for a given financial instrument. Regarding the FASB’s codification
techniques regarding fair value, Pounder notes, “The dominant fair value measurement
approach under U.S. GAAP is based on a three-level hierarchy of methods” (Pounder
2010). More specifically, there are three different Levels which may be used to determine
fair value, Levels 1 through 3. The FASB desires that relevant and observable inputs are
used for determining fair value measurements, which are used in Level 1 and Level 2.
Level 3 inputs, as will be discussed, are based on unobservable inputs and rely more
highly on estimates and valuation models and techniques. At times, an asset or liability
may fall into different hierarchy levels, and the FASB decided that the entire fair value
measurement should be decided based upon the lowest level in which any portion of the
asset or liability exists (FASB 2012).
Level 1 information is the most accurate representation of the current fair value of
an asset or liability and is defined as “quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for
identical assets or liabilities that the reporting entity has the ability to access at the
measurement date” (FASB 2012). For example, Level 1 information for an actively
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traded stock would be the market value of the stock on the measurement date (it must be
actively traded to be a Level 1 input, as it would be an accurate representation of its
current value). Because the stock market is generally instantaneously updated in today’s
business environment, it is able to provide reliable and, equally important, objective
information regarding fair value. Additionally, if any adjustment to the quoted market
price is needed, the asset or liability fails to qualify as a Level 1 input and falls into the
category of Level 2.
Level 2 information, located in the middle of the hierarchy, produces information
less reliable than Level 1 information, but still remains more subjective than Level 3
information. FASB (2012) defines Level 2 inputs as “inputs other than quoted prices
included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or
indirectly,” with specific examples seen in ASC 820-10-35-48. Whereas Level 1 inputs
include assets and liabilities in active markets, Level 2 inputs measure assets and
liabilities in inactive markets or slow-moving markets, but measurement is still
observable. Adjustments are needed to the Level 1 input, but the adjustments are not
severe enough to qualify it as a Level 3 input. To remain at Level 2, certain factors must
be known including the condition or location of the asset being valued, the comparability
of Level 1 assets and liabilities, and the volume of activity in the markets of the Level 2
instruments. An example of Level 2 information would include transactions such as
“receive-fixed, pay-variable interest rate swap based on a LIBOR swap rate,” or basing
the price of a building held and used on the per square foot price of other buildings in the
market in similar locations (FASB 820-10-55-21). These valuation methods would not be
as accurate as current U.S. interest rates (as opposed to LIBOR), or the price the building
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would actually sell for at the measurement date, but they are still able to provide reliable
data regarding the asset or liability’s fair values.
Finally, Level 3 inputs are basically a last resort, back-up plan for fair value
measurement because there is generally a large amount of subjective or unreliable
information used in determining fair value (Pounder 2010). They are defined as
“unobservable inputs for the asset or liability” (FASB 2012). An example of a Level 3
input is a “[t]here-year option on exchange-traded shares. A Level 3 input would include
historical volatility for the shares derived from the shares’ historical prices” (FASB 82010-55-22). This measurement thus provides unreliable information, as it is relying on
historical changes in exchange rates which have no bearing on current or future exchange
rates. Rather than using useful market information, Level 3 inputs rely heavily on
valuation techniques and are much more susceptible to subjectivity. Therefore, Level 3
inputs should only be used when there is absolutely no alternative, as they still provide a
more reliable valuation than predictions or no information at all. However, these Level 3
fair values pose significant complications to auditors who need assurance for the input,
assumptions used, and limitations of the valuation techniques (Power, 2010). Level 3
inputs depend heavily on pricing models by trying to incorporate risk into their valuation
techniques, and because of the uncertainty and subjectivity involved in valuing Level 3
inputs, the ASC offers extensive guidance on procedures for these inputs in paragraphs
820-10-35-54 through 55.
A severe limitation of fair value measurement under current GAAP is the
measurement of risk for fair values of assets and liabilities. While riskier financial
instruments may be measurable based on the three-level hierarchy, the valuation attained
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through the inputs may not provide a truly reliable representation of the fair value of the
instruments (Kaplan, 2011). This is especially true of complex financial instruments, such
as derivatives, which have recently stirred up controversy among accounting
professionals regarding fair value even further and have actually served as a “crucial
transformative catalyst” in accounting history as recent changes in GAAP are a direct
result of valuing complex financial instruments (Power, 2010). These are the same types
of instruments which will later be discussed as playing a role in the bursting bubble of the
financial crisis.
One such Accounting Standards Update (ASU), titled “Improving Disclosures
about Fair Value Measurements,” was designed to provide further disclosures in order to
more fully explain the techniques used to obtain fair value measurements, disclosing
which level (1, 2, or 3) inputs were used in determining fair value, and what the numbers
actually mean. This update, ASU No. 2010-06 went into effect on January 21, 2010 for
all reporting periods after December 15, 2009. ASU No. 2010-06 provides that auditors
must disclose transfers between Levels 1 and 2 based on the information available at the
measurement date and explain their reasoning behind the transfer. This lessens the
uncertainty of both the risk and reliability of fair value measurements, and provides
investors with a better understanding of the financial condition of the company. ASU No.
2010-06 also forces accountants to disclose the assumptions they use under Level 3
valuations and forces them to reconcile the beginning-of-period figures for Level 3
measurements to the end-of-period figures so that users may see how assumptions and
valuations have changed since the last reporting period. ASU No. 2010-06 also tried to
force reports to include a sensitivity of assumptions for Level 3 measurements, where
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accountants would include a best-case and worst-case scenario for assumptions, but this
disclosure amendment still remains on the table for the FASB (Pounder, 2010).
Introduction of SFAS 157
SFAS 157, “Fair Value Measurements,” is the accounting standard which
introduced the procedures and the various inputs previously discussed. FASB’s
overarching goal for this statement was to provide accurate values independent of
companies’ management’s opinion for items on their balance sheet. FAS 157 was issued
in September, 2006 (Trussel & Rose, 2009) and became effective for financial statements
after November 15, 2007 even though earlier application to financial statements was
encouraged (Zacharski, Rosenblat, Wagner, & Teufel,2007). The purpose of this standard
was to define fair value, establish a measuring technique to measure fair value as an
addition to GAAP, and to create new necessary disclosures for these techniques, which
have already been explored.
FAS 157 was a bold and transformative issuance for FASB on several accounts.
At the time of its institution, many accounting professionals were concerned about the
effects of switching from the traditional accounting principle of historical cost by
allowing assets and liabilities to be measured at their current fair market values. The
historical cost principle stated that assets and liabilities should be reported at the price
someone either paid for or received in the transaction, and remained unaccounted for
until they were either sold or involved in another transaction. Today, critics believe this
derivation to be a leading cause of the financial crisis. They argue that if the assets and
liabilities held by banks during the housing bubble would have been valued at their
historic cost, there would have been no liquidity crunch and thus, no collapse of the
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financial system. Their criticism is not without merit. As Trussel and Rose (2009) point
out that shortly after the issuance of FAS 157 was the time when many financial
institutions began to unravel, making FAS 157 an obvious and easy accounting standard
to blame.
Furthermore, critics have also voiced much opposition to the treatment of Level 3
holdings. They argue that auditors are unable to make objective determinations of the
value of these holdings. Consequently, since these holding must be calculated and
recorded, critics argue these valuations leads to detrimental pressure on financial
intuitions and the financial system as a whole. Rather than being classified as trading
securities or available-for-sale securities, critics advocate that these Level 3 holdings
should always be classified as held-to-maturity and thus be exempt from mark to market
unless the fair value option is chosen by the company (Moore & Baker, 2010). These
different types of securities will be discussed in the subsequent section.
While these criticisms hold merit, it will now be necessary to explore both
previous statements by FASB regarding fair value measurements and then explore the
actual market conditions during the time of the financial crisis before an adequate
conclusion can be reached on the effects of FAS 157. This will provide background to the
evolution of fair value theory, and ultimately justify the purpose and usefulness of fair
value accounting within the context of FASB’s standards. The additional Financial
Accounting Standards which will be explored are SFAS 115 “Accounting for Certain
Investments in Debt and Equity Securities” and SFAS 159 “The Fair Value Option for
Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities.”
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Types of Securities
SFAS 115 established three categories of investments: trading securities,
available- for-sale securities, and held-to-maturity securities. GAAP now has a working
definition for each of these securities. Trading securities are securities which the buyer
intends to sell within a short period of time; several days for instance. Available-for-sale
securities are those securities that have determinable values, but are not classified as
either trading or held-to-maturity securities. Held-to-maturity securities are those that the
reporting entity plans to and has the ability to hold until they reach their maturity (ASC
320-10-25-1). These different categories are important because they affect how different
securities are treated with regard to fair value measurements. Entities report both trading
securities and available-for-sale securities on their balance sheets at fair value. For
trading securities, their unrealized gains and losses (since no transaction has actually
taken place) are reported within net income. Available-for-sale securities, on the other
hand, have their unrealized gains and losses reported as a component of other
comprehensive income. Held-to-maturity securities are reported at their cost after any
amortization and are adjusted for any more than temporary impairments (Krumwiede,
Scadding, & Stevens, 2008).
However, SFAS 159, enacted in February, 2007, dramatically modified SFAS
115. SFAS 159 allowed a provision for reporting entities by allowing them to make an
election to classify a security normally classified as available-for-sale or held-to-maturity
under SFAS 115 at their fair value, with unrealized gains and losses reported within net
income rather than within other comprehensive income. The overarching goal of SFAS
159, as cited by Krumwiede, Scadding, & Stevens (2008) is “to improve financial
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reporting by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in reported
earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently without having to
apply complex hedge accounting provisions.” In other words, FASB believes the fair
value option gives financial statement users a more accurate representation of the current
financial standing of a company, based on how management intends to use its
investments.
This election became effective for business’s fiscal year beginning after
November 15, 2007. If an entity decides to adopt this standard, it is able to on a
“contract-by-contract” basis determine which existing and all subsequent assets and
liabilities will be reported on a fair value basis, with this election being irrevocable. In
addition to this election, entities must disclose their reasoning when they have certain
securities valued at fair value and others at historical cost if they are in a similar asset or
liability class (Cataldo & McInnes, 2007).
Finally, there is an exception or closed loop hole within SFAS 159 to prevent
entities from only using the fair value option when securities are increasing in value, and
then switching them back when the securities are losing value, thus intentionally
manipulating net income. For example, if an entity owns a security which had been
elected for the fair value option and was increasing in value, but because of current
market conditions the value of the security suddenly drops and is now underwater and the
entity tries to replace it by purchasing a similar security without declaring the fair value
option, SFAS 159 will not permit this, as it is not consistent with the Statement’s original
intention. The disclosures required under SFAS 159 discourage these types of violations
(Krumwiede, Scadding, & Stevens, 2008).
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The Securitization Process
What Is a Mortgage-backed Security (MBS)?
It is now possible to further explore the securities banks held on their financial
statements during the financial crisis. Alles (2009) defines mortgage backed securities
(MBS) as “debt instruments backed by mortgage pools, created by financial institutions
through a securitization process.” This process is crucial for banks as it allows them to
continue to issue mortgages to individuals and new loans to businesses as they transform
their existing loans into cash which finances the new loan, and the cycle begins over
again. The quality of the underlying mortgages in these securitized bonds determines the
class of the newly constructed bond, and thus affects the interest rate, maturity date, risk
level, and other factors associated with traditional debt instruments (Werkmeister, 2010).
Therefore, these instruments are critical to banks for them to be able to maintain enough
liquidity to continue their operations. An additional perk for banks using MBS is the
transfer of risk from the bank to the entity purchasing the MBS. This is advantageous to
the banking industry for two major reasons, one being that banks are no longer
maintaining the risk of default, but passing that risk along and two being that through the
transfer, the mortgages or loans are no longer carried on the bank’s balance sheet, freeing
them from regulations, such as reserve requirements, and improving their financial ratios
(Batchvarov, Hani, & Davies, 2002).
Any given MBS may contain 1,000 mortgages bundled together into various
tranches (levels) and rated based on the quality of the mortgages. In the years precluding
the financial crisis, these instruments were being securitized from subprime mortgages.
Ryan (2008) explains that in the late 1970s through the early 1980s, banks referred to
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“subprime” to describe commercial loans that failed to yield the prime rate because banks
were confident that these borrowers would not default and gave them a slightly better
than prime interest rate. However, the current use of the term “subprime” has almost an
exact opposite meaning, as since 1995 banks have used the term to describe “less than
highly creditworthy assets (e.g., subprime mortgages) that yield higher interest rates than
do prime assets with similar non-credit risks” (Ryan 2008). These assets are generally
considered less than creditworthy when borrowers have low credit ratings or are
apparently buying too much house as a percentage of their disposable income. The
following figure helps to picture how mortgages are separated into tranches within a
given MBS.

(Hull & White, 2010)
The portfolio, or the new debt instrument, is then rated based upon the tranches
within. Hull & White (2010), in their study of MBS, examined that AAA tranches
generally comprised 75-85 percent of the mortgage principle. However, banks decided to
make these already complex financial instruments even further in complexity when they
invented a new financial instrument called a collateralized debt obligation (CDO).
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Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps
Because of their complexity, especially in the years prior to the Great Recession,
CDOs and credit default swaps (CDS) will only briefly be explored for the purpose of
this paper. Because not all subprime mortgages were able to be packaged as what was
considered AAA MBSs, many AA and lower-graded subprime MBSs were restructured
and resecuritized as AAA collateralized debt obligations. Much like a MBS, CDOs are
composed of senior-to-junior tranches, and through the securitization process, most of
these CDOs were restructured so that their senior tranches were classified at a AAA
rating even though their true underlying assets were risky MBSs (Ryan, 2008). Banks
were able to justify an AAA rating because of the diversification levels of the mortgages
within a given portfolio, ranging from geographic location to the type and income of the
borrower. The AAA rating gave investors confidence that they were purchasing low risk
investment, when in reality the CDOs were based on a pool of BBB mortgage backed
securities (Thomas, 2010).
Additionally, Young, McCord, &Crawford (2010) define Credit Default Swaps
(CDS) as “an insurance-type contract which promises to cover the buyer of the contract’s
losses in the event of a default on the “insured” debt instrument.” In other words, a CDS
is an insurance policy on different debt instruments, MBSs and CDOs included.
Theoretically, CDSs are a useful tool for investors, as they have protection from the
various debt investments they make. However, insurance companies thought they were
insuring AAA CDOs, when in reality banks had hired different ratings agencies (such as
S&P and Moody’s) to give the securities a AAA rating (Young, McCord, & Crawford,
2010), and thus creating a conflict of interest for the ratings agencies.
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These ratings agencies should have been accurately portraying the inherent risk to
the securities, but were being paid by the banks creating the instruments, and as a result
the ratings agencies wanted to keep the banks pleased leading to insurance companies
cheaply insuring the instruments with CDSs. The following figure helps to visual the
entire securitization and insurance process, from the originators (banks) to the investor,
with guarantors (the insurance companies) supporting the process:
Figure 2

(Ryan, 2008).
The Great Recession
The Bubble Bursts
There is now a sufficient amount of background to explore the causes of the Great
Recession and to examine the role of Fair Value accounting to see whether or not it was a
major contributor. Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) researched the housing bubble by
studying the inflation in housing prices and other determinants of housing prices between
1998 and 2005 to try and explain whether or not there actually was a housing bubble.
Their study explains that housing prices within the United States rose only 18% from
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1975 through 1988, marking a healthy and steady level of inflation, while incomes of
Americans per capita rose approximately 40%. However, from 1998 through 2008,
housing prices (as a whole; without factors such as geographic location taken into
account) rose nearly 50% while incomes only grew between 5% and 11%. Additionally,
Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) calculated that between 1965 and 1995, the
homeownership rate ranged between 62% and 64%, but from 1995 through 2008
homeownership escalated to 69%, and that over the last decade (that is, 1995-2005) the
total number of renters in the United States has shrunk for the first time since World War
II.
The question is then raised that if incomes were shrinking over the same time
period that homeownership and housing prices were rising, how were Americans able to
purchase these houses and obtain loans from banks? The simple answer is the previously
discussed subprime mortgages which were bundled into MBSs. The following exhibit
helps to visualize the availability of subprime lending in the years leading to the housing
crisis.
Figure 3: Subprime Mortgage Originations

(Wheaton & Nechayev, 2008)
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This level of subprime lending left the housing market in an extremely fragile condition.
Cassidy (2008) as quoted by Moore and Baker (2010) offers an explanation for increased
subprime loans by stating:
In a move that could help increase home ownership rates among minorities and
low-income consumers, the Fannie Mae Corporation is easing the credit
requirements on loans that it will purchase from banks and other lenders. The
action, which will begin as a pilot program involving 24 banks in 15 markets will
encourage those banks to extend home mortgages to individuals whose credit is
generally not good enough to qualify for conventional loans. In addition, banks,
thrift institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help
them make more loans to so-called subprime borrowers. (p. 2)
The role of the government through Fannie Mae and other agencies goes beyond the
scope of this paper, but offers some background to the rapid utilization of subprime
mortgages by banks.
Furthermore, Kohn and Bryant (2010) describe the market in this way: “The
prevailing attitudes of ‘bigger is better,’ or ‘as much as one can afford,’ or ‘buy now
avoid future higher prices’ became the driving force for home buyers.” This mentality
was based on the assumption that housing prices would continue to rise at the rate they
had been over the past decade. Unfortunately but realistically, the bubble burst in a
correction beginning in 2007, leading to a vastly increasing number of defaults reaching
10% by the second quarter of 2009, and thus a dramatic decrease in housing prices (Mian
& Sufi, 2010). As will be seen in the adjacent section, this housing crisis dried up the
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extremely high levels of unemployment.

Figure 4: Weakness of Household Balance Sheets
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Figure 5: Household Defaults and Unemployment

(Mian & Sufi, 2010).
Lack of Liquidity Tied to Fair Value
GAAP requires holders of MBSs to report those MBSs at fair value. More
specifically, ASC 948-310-35-3 states, “Fair value for uncommitted mortgage-backed
securities that are collateralized by a mortgage banking entity's own loans ordinarily shall
be based on the fair value of the securities. If the trust holding the loans may be readily
terminated and the loans sold directly, fair value for the securities shall be based on the
fair value of the loans or the securities, depending on the mortgage banking entity's sales
intent. Fair value for other uncommitted mortgage-backed securities shall be based on
published mortgage-backed securities yields” (FASB 2012). Generally, when banks were
securitizing mortgage-backed securities, they had the intention of selling them to generate
extra liquidity to support future mortgages, thus qualifying them for fair value reporting.
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The bursting housing bubble created a serious predicament for the banking
industry. As many subprime borrowers began to default all at once, the value of MBSs
began to decline dramatically, leaving most completely worthless. What investors saw as
a risk-free asset because of its AAA rating had imploded, and from January through
March, 2008, major insurers of these instruments reported huge losses on mortgagebacked securities, collateralized debt obligations, and the credit default swaps insurance
policies (Ryan 2008). Because of FAS 157, banks and holders of these securities were
required to record them at fair value.
The fair value of a MBS became an extremely difficult process. Before the
housing crisis, most MBSs were considered Level 2 inputs as they were not actively
traded, but there was a rapidly growing market for these securities. Therefore, there was
still a substantial amount of information in the market for financial statement preparers to
find quoted bid and ask prices. However, after the housing crisis the market for
mortgage-backed securities evaporated, leaving the securities with little to no price
transparency (Ryan 2008). Because of the unavailability of an active market, the value of
a given MBS converted from a Level 2 measurement to the much more subjective Level
3 measurement. ASC 820-10-35-26 states that a change in valuation technique must be
accounted for as a change in accounting estimate, and as a result, is subject to further
disclosure on financial statements (FASB 2012).
McMahon (2011) describes the effect of the written down mortgage-backed
securities on the leverage ratios of banks. When housing prices were growing, it allowed
banks to further leverage themselves because of the gains they were making on the risky
loan assets. However, when the market took a downturn, the previous balance sheet
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equity evaporated because of fair value reporting. McMahon (2011) further evaluates that
if a bank is leveraged at 10 times, if the overall assets of that bank drop 9%, which was
no stretch of the imagination for the Financial Crisis, then it would cause leverage to
apparently leap to 91. It is because this was happening at every bank, that not only could
they no longer create new loans because of their excessive leverage ratios, but they also
were forced to deleverage their balance sheets to the regulated levels, as impossible as it
seemed with their enormous leverage ratios. This had a ripple effect into the economy as
a whole, as businesses and individuals could not obtain financing to maintain a stable
economic system.
Fair Value or Poor Decision Making?
After evaluating the preponderance of evidence of the economic condition of the
United States, especially within the banking industry at the start of the financial crisis, it
is conclusive that SFAS 157 and fair value accounting was not the sole or even major
contributor of the financial crisis. Seay and Ford (2010) explained the ethical dilemma in
fair value accounting: “Politicians, lobbyists, and media representatives may not
understand the operation of the capital markets and accounting’s key role in resource
allocation decisions within those markets.” In other words, much of the criticism of the
accounting practices throughout the recent meltdown has come from sources who do not
fully comprehend the role of the accountant in the capital market.
Accounting during financial crises should be no different than when markets are
running efficiently, and was no different during the Great Recession than at any other
point in the profession’s history. The SEC declared that fair value increased the quality
and the reliability of financial statements for investors (Seay & Ford, 2010), and although
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it was extremely painful, fair value ultimately revealed the current and future risk which
banks were carrying on their books and hiding in securitizations. The level of subprime
loans banks were lending, the risk levels associated with the insurance of these loans, and
the inaccurate ratings of the securitized bonds were all major contributors and direct
causes of the crisis. Rather than criticize fair value accounting for causing the recession,
mark to market should be applauded for revealing the true economic condition of the
country leading to a market correction as painful as it felt for the greater economy.
The Future of Fair Value Accounting
Recent FV News
Recently, fair value has made substantial headway in news outlets as it has been a
popular element at the forefront of current accounting issues. Even after the financial
crisis, banks’ use of fair value accounting has been frowned upon which has only further
ignited the debate amongst accounting professionals. An article from the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ) reported that J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., for example, made a “debt
valuation adjustment” which increased their 2011 third-quarter earnings by $1.9 billion.
This gain arose from a decline in the market value of J.P. Morgan’s debt, mainly “certain
structured and derivative liabilities” (much like, if not the same structured liabilities
discussed earlier in the paper), and thus reported huge earnings with no operations tied to
the earnings. In an interview for the article, accounting and tax expert Willens said, “I
think this is the kind of thing that gives accountants a bad name, frankly” (Rapoport &
Lucchetti, 2011).
In this same quarter, Bank of America likewise reported $6.2 billion in gains
corresponding from a drop in the value of their debt. These fluctuations in earnings have
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confused certain investors, especially unknowledgeable ones, regarding comparisons
between the actual financial conditions of the major banks. (The major banks include
Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley Wells Fargo & Co., and
Goldman Sachs). However, most of these fluctuations are not a result of fair value
accounting in and of itself but rather largely because these big banks are constantly
attempting to use the rules of fair value accounting to gain short-term advantages over
their competitors (Reilly, 2011).
Possibly the most blatant example of attempting to tamper with short-term gains
was reported by the WSJ in the article “Will Goldman Mark Down It’s Principle?” Reilly
(2011) proclaimed: “It’s fine to have principles on Wall Street, just so long as they don’t
get in the way of short-term gains.” He then explains that Goldman and Morgan Stanley
were considering and actually attempted to reclassify certain investments to historical
cost to keep pace with the gigantic gains J.P. Morgan reported. Rather than being
concerned with financial reporting to fairly represent their company’s financial position
to investors and creditors, it appears that banks are more concerned with using accounting
procedures to create a façade on their income sheets and balance sheets to falsely
persuade the market they are in a better position than they actually are. Banks should be
more concerned with evaluating risk of their underlying investments and debt issues and
should attempt to clearly and fairly communicate these levels through their value on
financial statements and disclosures about their actual nature.
Finally, the Federal Reserve will be creating new regulations to limit the
interconnectedness of these major banking institutions. The net credit exposure which
will be allowed between any two of the six largest institutions cannot exceed 10% of the
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company’s regulatory capital, as compared to the 25% allowed for most other firms under
the Dodd-Frank bill (McGrane & Fitzpatrick, 2011). The Fed believes limiting the credit
exposure amongst these institutions will prevent the severity experienced during the
Great Recession from recurring in the future and will cause these banks to return to a
more traditional banking model of making traditional loans to individuals and businesses
as opposed to the recent risky investments and securitizations observed in banks.
Although this may decrease the profitability of the financial institutions, the Fed believes
this regulation will hopefully eliminate paper gains and benefit society by preventing a
similar financial meltdown.
Fair Value Is Here To Stay
Regardless of the opposition to fair value accounting, it appears that FASB will
not curtail its procedures for mark-to-market. Therefore, accountants must learn to
become content with the current procedures and enhance their expertise in valuation
techniques. Power (2011) argues, “So the intellectualization of financial reporting in the
shadow of financial economics is not simply an issue of technical measurement – it is a
blueprint for redesigning the knowledge base of an entire profession.” Therefore, it is
apparent that fair valuation has become a blueprint for future accounting practices and
will only continue to expand, not only within GAAP, but also in convergence with the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in international standards.
Likewise, auditors will be challenged in the future with determining the reliability
of financial statements when fair value measurements are involved, especially when
Level 3 inputs are involved. Foster and Shastri (2010) acknowledge that auditors must be
extremely aware of deceptive practices in these valuations as corporate managers are able
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to manipulate their valuation techniques to deceive their creditors and investors, as was
seen with the major collapses of Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers during the financial
crisis. Therefore, the future will be a challenging time for auditors and users of financial
statements, especially in the area of fraud, as illiquid markets offer enough uncertainty
for companies to skew their financial information (Foster & Shastri, 2010). It will be
interesting to see the new techniques auditors begin to employ as fair valuation expands
in financial practice.
Pannese and DelFavero (2010) believe the recent implications of FASB will
eventually lead to the historical cost principle no longer being taught in academia over
the next several decades. They argue that the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) should make a concerted effort to replace education of historic cost with
innovative valuation techniques. They also fear that current accounting students will not
be fully prepared to meet the current challenges in the transition from historic cost to FV,
as their education is taking place at the precipice of this transition. As FV continues to
develop, it will be crucial for the PCAOB and auditors to continue to adapt to the new
issues by FASB in addition to its convergence project with the IASB.
Conclusion
Accounting professionals must dismiss their fears of fair value accounting. It is
healthy for the profession to continue to criticize these procedures to ensure the greatest
reliability for users of financial statements, but to revert back to historic cost would be a
major regression for GAAP. It should now be apparent that while fair value accounting
may have increased the severity of the financial crisis or prematurely began it, this
technique surfaced the hidden, unwise, and deceptive decisions banks and other financial
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institutions were making. It is certainly possible that without the issuance of SFAS 157 in
2006, the historic cost method would have continued to allow the bubble to expand, and
eventually burst into a much deeper recession than the one currently being witnessed.
As an excellent summation for mark to market’s true role in the financial crisis,
Hughes (2008), in an interview in a Financial Times article reported, “Accounting
doesn’t create reality, it reflects it. Here it has clarified where there are some issues and
has illuminated them. In the criticism there is an element of ‘we don’t like the answer. If
you use market valuations, that by nature creates volatility because markets are volatile.
But accounting is only reflecting that volatility.” Fair value did not create the reality seen
in the Great Recession, it merely reflected the corrosive business practices which were
slowly destroying the economy.
Many professionals and market observant will continue in their attempt to repeal
SFAS 157 and all related mark to market practices, but their efforts will be much more
fruitful spent on improving the current system. Fair value accounting will ultimately hold
decision makers to a higher standard in the daily operations of their company and will
prevent financial institutions and their executives from making risky bets to turn a quick
profit. Rather, knowing that fair value accounting is the future of reporting will cause
executives to make sound business decisions or otherwise have their financial statements
disclose the true nature of their decisions.
This is a historic period for the accounting profession, and the future of the
accounting profession will remember FAS 157 for its progressive and transformational
effect on financial reporting. Accounting has and will always be focused on improving
the reliability of financial statements, and fair value accounting will only continue to help
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users understand the current financial condition of the businesses with whom they
interact.
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